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I. INTRODUCTION
This is an issue that has come under increasing scrutiny amid allegations
of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations (U.N.) personnel,
including peacekeeping forces, and allegations that peacekeepers introduced
cholera to Haiti.1 Any starting point for considering whether the U.N. is
“above the law” and possible innovative “legal responses to build a more
accountable U.N.” is an analysis of where the U.N. is today on these
important issues.2 Following is a two-part analysis: first of the remedies
available generally to third parties harmed by the activities of U.N.
peacekeeping operations with a particular focus on the Haiti cholera victims;
second, of the regime governing sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N.
personnel and U.N. peacekeeping forces. As this two-part analysis will
demonstrate, the problems that have arisen that raise the issue whether the
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1. Panel including August Reinisch, Caramba Kandeh, and Beatrice Lindstrom, moderated by
Kristen Boon, Above The Law? Innovating New Legal Responses to Build a More Accountable U.N.,
International Law Weekend of the ILA/ 2 ILSA (2016).
2. For discussion of where the U.N. might go in the future to address possible innovative ways
to build a more accountable future see August Reinisch, To What Extent Can and Should National Courts
‘Fill the Accountability Gap?’, 10 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 572 (2014); Kristen E. Boon, The United Nations
as Good Samaritan: Immunity and Responsibility, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 341 (Winter 2016); CODE BLUE, A
Practical Plan to End Impunity for Peacekeeper Sexual Abuse, http://static1.squarespace.com/static/514a
0127e4b04d7440e8045d/t/588289db2994ca3d59b93c38/1484949980156/FINAL+Special+Courts+Mec
hanism+-+Updated+January+2017.pdf (last updated Jan. 2017).
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U.N. is “above the law” stem more from failures to timely and
conscientiously follow the provisions of existing regimes that govern these
matters rather than the absence of appropriate obligations or mechanisms
under those existing regimes—the absence of the political will to do the right
thing in a timely manner!
II. REMEDIES GENERALLY AVAILABLE TO THIRD PARTIES HARMED
BY U.N. PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.
Since the creation of the U.N., the need for the organization to enjoy
immunity from the jurisdiction of Member States has been widely recognized
as necessary to achieve its important and far ranging purposes under the U.N.
Charter.3 However, throughout the years, it has been understood that this
immunity was not intended simply to shield the Organization from
responsibility as a “good citizen” on the world stage to respond to justifiable
claims against the Organization by third parties resulting from the activities
or operations of the Organization. The U.N. has largely achieved the
objective of assuming its responsibility as a good citizen, although three
recent situations in the peacekeeping context have raised questions about
whether it continues to do so—claims against the U.N. by the Mothers of
Srebrenica, displaced persons in Kosovo, and Haiti cholera victims.
Generally, claims by third parties against the U.N. cover a broad range
of claimants who allege to have been harmed in some way by the activities
or operations of the Organization, and generally divide into two categories:
claims of a contractual nature and tort claims.
In regard to third party contract claims, individual consultants,
contractors—large and small—and others who interact with the U.N.,
including in the peacekeeping context, generally must seek to resolve their
claims in some manner under Section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the U.N. (the General Convention)—calling for the U.N.
to establish a modality for resolving disputes of a private law character.4
The principal modality for resolving disputes of a private law character
since the inception of the U.N. has meant initially an effort to amicably
resolve the dispute administratively e.g., negotiated settlement. Failing such
an amicable resolution, the usual modality has been for the parties to seek to
resolve the dispute through arbitration, usually under the terms of the contract
entered into with the Organization that provide for such arbitration and
specifies how it is to be organized.5
                                                
3. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶¶ 1–4; U.N. Charter art. 105, ¶ 1.
4. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 8, Feb. 13, 1946,
21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
5. Bruce Rashkow, Immunity of the United Nations: Practice and Challenges, 10 INT’L ORG.
L. REV. 332, 337–39 (2013).
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In regard to tort claims, initially, the focus was on automobile accidents
involving U.N. vehicles or vehicles driven by U.N. staff or officials in the
performance of official functions—including in the field. Over the years, as
the role of the U.N. expanded in the area of peacekeeping and other field
missions, it became necessary or desirable for the Organization to obtain its
own air carrier capability, routinely through charter arrangements with
providers of the aircraft, rather than rely on services provided by commercial
entities or even member states. In both instances, the U.N. has relied on
worldwide insurance policies to address its exposure to risks of third party
claims, although in regard to air services it also seeks to protect itself
contractually by shifting the risk to the provider of the aircraft.6
In regard to third party claims resulting from the operations and
activities of operational subsidiary bodies of the U.N. in the field, e.g., UNDP
and UNICEF, those organizations routinely enter into agreements with the
beneficiary states where such activities occur to hold harmless the
Organization in respect of claims that may arise in relation to its activities.7
With respect to peacekeeping missions, the Organization has internal
administrative processes in place to deal with claims against the
Organization.8 Initially, these processes have included local internal claims
review boards the decisions of which may be challenged by requests for
further administrative review within the Organization.9 As a practical matter,
these boards have worked well over the years to resolve claims on a day-to-
day basis, even if at times their decisions have been administratively
challenged.
However, the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with the States in
which such peacekeeping missions take place have historically also provided
routinely for a standing claims commission. Notably, throughout the history
of U.N. peacekeeping missions no such commission has ever been
established.10
                                                
6. See Rashkow, supra note 5.
7. Id. at 340; see also Michael Wood, Do International Organizations Enjoy Immunity Under
Customary International Law?, in 55 LEGAL ASPECTS INT’L ORG., IMMUNITY INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 12 (Niels M. Blokker & Nico J. Schrijver eds., 2015).
8. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 339; see also Administration of Justice in the United Nations, A
Guide to Resolving Disputes, 1 (2009), http://www.un.org/en/oaj/unjs/pdf/guide_to_resolving_disputes_
en.pdf.
9. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 339–41; U.N. Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary
Aspect of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. A/51/389 (Sept. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Peacekeeping Liability
Report I].
10. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 344–45; see also Peacekeeping Liability Report I, supra note 9,
¶ 8; U.N. Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspect of the Financing of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
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Over the years, for one reason or another, tort claims have usually been
amicably resolved without recourse to arbitration.11 That said, occasionally,
the Organization has been sued or threatened to be sued in a national court.
Such suits are inevitably either amicably resolved or dismissed on the basis
of the Organization’s immunity.12
In the late 1990s, however, in response to the growth in peacekeeping
missions and related claims, the Organization adopted a special regime to
deal specifically with third party contract and tort claims arising in the
context of such missions.13
Notably, the Organization went to great lengths in designing this regime
to balance the obligations of U.N. peacekeeping missions to respond to third
party claims with the obligations of the host country that invited such mission
into the country to assume some responsibility in principle for such claims.14
That balance resulted in certain types of claims being excluded altogether
and limits being set on the damages for which the Organization would be
liable in relation to certain contract and tort claims. The Organization
established these financial limitations with the understanding that the host
country would ultimately be responsible for compensation, if any, beyond
these limits.15
The regime excludes liability altogether for claims resulting from or
attributable to activities of U.N. peacekeepers arising from “operational
necessity”. 16 The concept of “operational necessity” was developed
specifically in connection with U.N. peacekeeping operations and, while
similar to the more traditional concept of “military necessity”, goes a bit
further.17 Notably, the concept of “military necessity”, governed by the laws
of war, remains under the new regime as an exemption from liability
specifically relating to combat operations.18
The new regime imposes temporal and financial limitations on the
liability of the Organization in terms of personal injury, illness or death and
                                                
A/51/903 (May 21, 1997) [hereinafter Peacekeeping Liability Report II].
11. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 340; see also August Reinisch, Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIB. OF INT’L. L. (2009), http://legal.
un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa_e.pdf.
12. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 340–41.
13. See G.A. Res. 52/247, Third-Party Liability: Temporal and Financial Limitations (July 17,
1998).
14. Peacekeeping Liability Report I, supra note 9, ¶ 20.
15. Id. ¶¶ 39, 42.
16. See G.A. Res. 52/247, supra note 13, ¶ 6; Peacekeeping Liability Report I, supra note 9, ¶
14.
17. See Peacekeeping Liability Report I, supra note 9, ¶ 16.
18. Id.
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for property damage resulting from or attributable the activities of
peacekeeping operations in the performance of their official duties.19 In this
last respect, it also excludes certain kinds of damages, e.g., non-economic
loss.20
The new regime recognizes that third party claims may continue to be
addressed, as they have in the past, by local claims review boards.21 It also
preserves the long-standing but never invoked option under SOFA
arrangements for the establishment of a standing claims commission.22
Underlying the efforts of the Organization throughout the years to
amicably settle third party claims is the desire or goal of the U.N. to be, and
to be seen as, a good citizen on the world stage; to be fundamentally fair in
dealing with individuals injured in some manner as a direct result of U.N.
actions.
However, with the increase in peacekeeping activities and the evolution
of more robust peacekeeping mandates since the end of the Cold War, the
realities of such a more active engagement have raised new challenges.
These challenges are perhaps most clearly reflected in the decisions of the
U.N. in invoking immunity in the face of claims by the Mothers of
Srebrenica, the displaced persons in Kosovo and the Haitian cholera victims.
On the one hand, with both the Mothers of Srebrenica and the Kosovo
cases, the issue is the failure of the U.N. to appropriately protect innocent
civilians in situations involving threats of armed hostilities. In the case of
Mothers of Srebrenica, it was the failure of the U.N. peacekeeping mission
to protect such civilians from almost certain death pursuant to a policy, if not
mandate, to provide such protection in the face of an armed attack by hostile
forces.23 In the case of Kosovo24, it was the placement by the U.N. Interim
Administration in Kosovo of internal displaced persons in camps to protect
such civilians from the threat of armed hostilities that, because of lead
pollution, resulted in damage to their health. With the Haitian cholera
victims, it is the issue of the ostensible negligence of the U.N. in failing to
adequately screen troops for cholera prior to deployment in Haiti or to
                                                
19. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 340–41.
20. See G.A. Res. 52/247, supra note 13.
21. Id.
22. Peacekeeping Liability Report I, supra note 9.
23. European Court of Human Rights Press Release ECHR 194, Complaint About UN’s
Immunity from National Jurisdiction in Civil Case Concerning Srebrenica Massacre Declared
Inadmissible (June 27, 2013) [hereinafter Press Release].
24. Letter from U.N. Under-Secretary-General Addressing the Claim for Compensation on
Behalf of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Residents of Internally Displaced Person (“IDP”) Camps in
Mitrovica, Kosovo, UNITED NATIONS (July 25, 2011), http://www.sivola.net/download/UN%20Rejection
.pdf [hereinafter Claim for Compensation].
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properly maintain waste treatment facilities utilized by such troops that
arguably caused a cholera outbreak that affected innocent civilians.25
In each of these cases, the U.N. declined to accept responsibility to
compensate the victims for injuries they suffered as a result of the actions of
those U.N. missions.
The Mothers of Srebrenica case was initially brought in Dutch courts
where the U.N. maintained its immunity. 26 The Dutch Supreme Court,
overruling the Appellate Court, upheld that immunity as absolute, indicating
that the assertion of immunity under Section 2 of the General Convention is
not affected by the failure of the U.N. to provide a modality for bringing these
claims under Section 29 of the Convention.27 The ruling of the Dutch
Supreme Court raises a fundamental issue of the relationship of the claimed
immunity under Section 2 of the General Convention to the requirement
under Section 29 for the U.N. to provide a modality for reviewing these
claims.28 The ruling also raises the issue of what is meant under Section 29
by its reference to disputes of a “private law character”.29
The claimants appealed this decision to the European Court of Human
Rights.30 That Court declared the application of the Mothers of Srebrenica
inadmissible. In so doing, the Court upheld the immunity of the U.N. stating,
in passing, that what was at issue were operations established by the Security
Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter fundamental to
the mission of the U.N. to secure international peace and security, and the
Convention (European Convention on Human Rights) cannot be interpreted
in a manner that would subject the acts and omissions of the Security Council
to domestic jurisdiction without the accord of the U.N.31
The use of force under a U.N. Security Council mandate is always a
complex issue. The distinction that the Court drew between Chapter VII
peacekeeping operations established by the Security Council and the
requirement of the European Convention is inherently relevant and important
to the issue of whether the actions of the U.N. troops that are at the heart of
                                                
25. See generally Cholera Litigation Frequently Asked Questions, INST. FOR JUST. &
DEMOCRACY HAITI, http://www.ijdh.org/2014/12/topics/health/cholera-litigation-faq/ (last visited on
Feb. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
26. Thomas Henquet, Introductory Note to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands: Mothers of
Srebrenica Association et al. v. The Netherlands, 51 I.L.M. 1322–363 (2012).
27. Id.; see also Bella Murati, U.N. Immunity Overrides Ius Cogens Norms of International
Law, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (July 23, 2013), https://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/07/23/unimm
unity-overrides-ius-cogens-norms-of-international-law/#more-2135.
28. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 342.
29. Id.
30. Press Release, supra note 23.
31. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 344.
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the claims of the Mothers of Srebrenica present a claim under Section 29 of
a “private law character”.
In the Kosovo case, the U.N. Interim Administration asserted that the
claims do constitute claims of a private law character, adding that the claims
‘in essence amount to a review of the performance of the U.N.’s mandate as
the Interim Administration of Kosovo’.32 Notably in exercising its authority
as “the Interim Administration”, the U.N. arguably was exercising
“governmental authority” on behalf of or in the place of whatever national
governmental entity might have been responsible for the area in the absence
of the U.N. Security Council having created a U.N. peacekeeping mission to
do so. It is important to note what would appear to be critical distinctions
between that situation and the Haiti situation.
Initially, and perhaps most critical, is the fact that in Kosovo, the U.N.
was not operating in the capacity simply of a “peacekeeping mission”. It was
acting in the capacity essentially of the temporary governmental authority—
the “Interim Administration”. Moreover, in this context, in explaining its
position, the U.N. addressed other possibly critical factors relating to the long
history of industrial pollution in the area and the precarious security situation
in Kosovo to which the U.N. was responding in order to protect lives.33
Arguably, when the U.N. acts in such circumstances, it is acting in a
“governmental capacity” as well as a peacekeeping capacity, especially given
the security aspects of the precarious situation and the risk to innocent lives.
In this respect, there is a much stronger case for characterizing the actions of
the “Interim Administration” as addressing political or policy matters of a
governmental nature that do not give rise to claims of a private law character
within the meaning of Section 29, than there is in the Haiti situation.
On the other hand, it is much more difficult to see how the new
peacekeeping liability regime would not apply to the Haitian cholera victims.
More specifically, it is difficult to understand the position of the U.N. that
these claims “are not receivable”.
In the case of the Haitian cholera victims, the U.N. initially and for a
long time simply took the position that the claims are “not receivable”.34 The
only rationale publicly provided in asserting this defense was its assertion
that considering those claims would necessarily include a review of political
                                                
32. Claim for Compensation, supra note 24.
33. Id.
34. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 25. See also Jonathan M. Katz, U.N. Admits
Role in Cholera Epidemic in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016
/08/18/world/americas/united-nations-haiti-cholera.html?_r=0.
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or policy matters.35 The claimants while continuing to urge the Organization
to establish a claims commission under the terms of the SOFA with Haiti to
review these claims, filed suit against the U.N. in the Federal District Court
in New York.36
The U.N. did not respond to the lawsuit and, instead, requested that the
United States Government seek dismissal of the case on the U.N.’s behalf.37
In March 2014, the U.S. Attorney filed a statement of interest in the case,
asserting the absolute immunity of the defendants under Section 2 of the
General Convention.38 During the briefing and hearing on the issue of
immunity, the claimants clarified that they were not arguing that there had
been a waiver of immunity, express or implied, but that, because the U.N.
had failed to provide a modality for resolving their claims in breach of its
obligations under Section 29, the U.N. was not entitled to assert immunity
under Section 2 of the Convention, among other arguments.39 In January
2015 the District Court judge dismissed the case on the basis of the U.N.’s
immunity from suit under Section 2.40 Plaintiffs appealed in February 2015
and, following the submission of briefs, the case was argued before the Court
in March 2015.41 The Court handed down its opinion on August 18, 2016,
affirming the decision of the lower court.42 But that decision, while resolving
the claim in those courts on the basis of the absolute immunity of the U.N.
under Section 2 of the General Convention, does not answer the question of
whether the Haitian claims are of a “private law character” under Section 29
of the General Convention.
The history and basis of a defense that tort claims by third parties against
the U.N. “are not receivable” apparently is relatively recent, and until the
Haiti cholera case has not been the subject of much scrutiny. For example,
it came to the attention of a number of scholars, only during the course of the
public discussion of the Haiti cholera case, that the Organization in 2011 used
that formulation in response to claims against the Organization in the
                                                
35. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 343; see also Edith M. Lederer, U.N. Rejects Damage Claim for
Haiti Cholera Victims, INST. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY HAITI (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.ijdh.org/2013
/02/topics/health/un-rejects-damage-claim-for-haiti-cholera-victims/.
36. See Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that in
October 2013, IJDH and partners filed a class-action lawsuit against the U.N. in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, on behalf of Haitian and Haitian-American cholera victims and their
families). Subsequently, two other class actions were filed against the U.N., another in the Southern
District of New York and a third in the Eastern District of New York.
37. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 25.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See generally Georges, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246.
41. See Georges v. United Nations, 834 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2016).
42. Id.
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Kosovo.
That said, for a long time, the U.N. has declined to explain the basis of
its assertions in the Haiti cholera matter that the claims are “not receivable”
because considering those claims would necessarily include a review of
political or policy matters. However, recently, in two instances, the U.N.
offered a fuller explanation of the basis of its position.
The first such fuller explanation was a letter dated November 24, 2014
from the Secretary General responding to a letter dated 25 September 2014
from three Special Rapporteurs and one Independent Expert appointed by the
Human Rights Council which constituted in the Human Rights context an
“allegation” letter.43 The “allegation” letter suggests that the U.N. by its
response to the claims of the Haiti cholera victims violated the human rights
of these victims in a number of respects, most particularly by denying that
the U.N. was the cause of the cholera outbreak and by denying the victims a
right to a legal remedy.44 In accordance with established procedures with
such “allegation” letters, the U.N. was requested to provide a response to the
concerns expressed in the letter.45
The second such fuller explanation was a letter from the Secretary
General dated February 19, 2015 responding to a letter to him dated
December 18, 2014, by 77 Members of the U.S. Congress urging the U.N. to
provide a modality to review the claims of the Haitian cholera victims.46
The Secretary General’s November 25, 2014 response to the
“allegation” letter deals at considerable length in denying the “human rights
basis” for the claims of the victims.47 In respect of the “legal basis” for
rejecting these claims, the November 25 letter asserts the argument that
claims based on political or policy related grievances “such as those related
to the actions or decisions taken by the Security Council or the General
Assembly” are excluded.48 However, it goes on to establish a principled legal
framework for determining whether particular claims qualify as having a
                                                
43. Letter from Pedro Medrano, Assistant U.N. Secretary-General, Senior Coordinator for
Cholera Response to Ms. Farha, Mr. Gallon, Mr. Pura and Ms. de Albuquerque, UNITED NATIONS (Nov.
25, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/Haiti-Nov14-explanation-to-SRs.pdf [hereinafter
Letter from Pedro Medrano].
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Feb. 19, 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the Distinguished Members of Congress (Feb. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Letter from Ban Ki-moon]. See
also Jake Johnson, Ban Ki-moon Explains to Congress Why the U.N. Won’t be Held Accountable for
Cholera in Haiti, HAITI RELIEF & RECONSTRUCTION WATCH (Feb. 27, 2015), http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-
relief-and-reconstruction-watch/ban-ki-moon-explains-to-congress-why-the-un-wont-be-held
accountable-for-cholera-in-haiti.
47. Letter from Pedro Medrano, supra note 43.
48. Id.
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“private law character”.49 Thus, it asserts that in assessing a claim under
Section 29, the “Organization does not rely solely on the allegations of the
claim itself but also assesses the character of the claim in the context of all
of its circumstances.”50 It further asserts that “the nature of the duty allegedly
owed by the Organization, the nature of the conduct or activity at issue, and
other relevant circumstances are all pertinent”.51
The letter addresses three instances where claims were asserted but the
U.N. declined to recognize such claims, as if to suggest that these examples
support the conclusion that the Haitian claims do not and cannot qualify
under the framework set out as having a “private law character”. 52
Unfortunately, the examples cited do not support that conclusion. Two of
the instances were the Mothers of Srebrenica case and the claims of the
Kosovo displaced persons, already addressed above and distinguishable from
the Haiti situation for reasons previously discussed.53 The third instance was
the refusal of the U.N. in 1996 to accede to a request by the Rwandan
Government in 1996 to establish a claims commission to review fourteen
claims relating to the alleged failure of the U.N. (UNAMIR) in the context
of the 1994 genocide to provide protection to Rwandan nationals.54 While
this appears to have been the first public discussion of the Rwandan request,
the Rwandan case is similar in nature to the Mothers of Srebrenica case, and
can be distinguished on the same basis that the claims relate to an issue of a
use of force by a U.N. peacekeeping force under a Chapter VII resolution by
the Security Council. In conclusion, while this “fuller” explanation is more
detailed than both the earlier ones made during the litigation in U.S. courts
(and also the later one made to the 77 U.S. Congressmen), it fails to explain
how the Haitian claims do not qualify as having a “private law character.”
The Secretary General’s response of February 19, 2015 to the 77 U.S.
Congressmen’s letter highlights the serious efforts of the U.N. to address the
crisis—at the national and local level.55 Unfortunately, the letter does not
resolve the longstanding controversy of whether the U.N. shares any legal
responsibility for the crisis. The Secretary General’s letter again correctly
focuses on the legal issue of whether the Haitian victims may be viewed as
having a claim against the Organization under Section 29 of the General
Convention, or under the SOFA between the U.N. and Haiti.56 The letter
                                                
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Letter from Pedro Medrano, supra note 43.
53. Rashkow, supra note 5 at 344; Claim for Compensation, supra note 24.
54. Letter from Pedro Medrano, supra note 43.
55. Letter from Ban Ki-moon, supra note 46.
56. Id.
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notes that Section 29 is limited by its terms to consideration of private law
claims, going on to broadly describe such claims as those “arising under
contracts, claims relating to the use of private property in peacekeeping
contexts or claims arising from motor vehicle accidents”, and acknowledges
that the Organization has regularly received and provided compensation for
such claims.57 However, it goes on to assert that claims by Haitian victims
are “not receivable” because, unlike the other claims mentioned, those claims
“raised broad issues of policy that arose out of the functions of the U.N. as
an international organization” and, therefore, “could not form the basis of a
private law character”.58 Essentially for the same reason, the letter dismisses
the argument that Haitian victims should be able to bring their claims before
a claims commission established pursuant to the SOFA.59 Notably, the letter
does not identify the “broad issues of policy that arose out of the functions
of the U.N. as an international organization” upon which it is relying to
distinguish the Haiti claims from the kinds of claims it acknowledges are
recognized as receivable, or otherwise to explain how the Haiti claims “d[o]
not fall within the scope of Section 29.”60
Initially, as a matter of principle, it would be possible, as the letter from
the Members of the U.S. Congress proposed, to establish a claims
commission under the SOFA to address the Haitian claims. No such
commission has ever been established despite the fact that the authority to do
so has been included in virtually every SOFA executed over the long history
of U.N. peacekeeping missions.
Establishing such a commission for the first time in these circumstances
presents a number of complex legal and practical issues. Initially, it would
be necessary to establish the composition and mandate for such a
commission, including the standard for compensation of victims. It would
also be necessary to identify funding to provide such compensation. Such an
exercise has been complicated in the matter of the Haitian cholera victims by
years of inaction and intervening events, such as the earthquake of 2010 and
the recent devastating hurricane. For example, identifying the victims and
causation in these circumstances raises significant challenges in a country
where allegedly there is not a regular and reliable system for recording these
matters.61 Of course, in the U.N., there is always the issue of providing the
funds to establish and operate such a commission and for compensating the
thousands of claimants. 62 Even were there a will to establish such a
                                                
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Letter from Ban Ki-moon, supra note 46.
61. See U.N. Secretary-General, A New Approach to Cholera in Haiti, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/71/620
(Nov. 25, 2016) [hereinafter New Approach].
62. Id. ¶¶ 58–59.
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commission, providing relief to the victims through such a mechanism could
take years.
In any event, such a commission is not the only way that the
Organization can acknowledge any responsibility it may have for the crisis
or respond to claims. Thus, the U.N. has routinely handled such third party
claims in the past through local internal review boards established in the
peacekeeping missions, or through negotiated settlement agreements.
Indeed, in 1965, in another situation that, somewhat like this case, involved
mass claims relating to the activities of the U.N. peacekeeping mission—in
the Congo (ONUC), the Organization negotiated lump sum settlements to
resolve the matter.
In the late 1960s, the U.N. was faced with some 1400 claims by Belgian
nationals as well as claims from individuals from various other countries for
damage to persons and property in the Congo caused by U.N. peacekeepers.
In that instance, the U.N. negotiated a lump sum settlement of all Belgium
nationals with the Belgian Government accepting $1.5 million as a final
settlement of such claims.63 A similar lump sum settlement was reached with
the USSR regarding claims by Russian nationals.
Under the circumstances, it is difficult to understand the argument that
the Haiti claims are not of a “private law character” under Section 29,
especially given the long practice of the U.N. in recognizing claims by those
injured as a direct result of U.N. activities including in the peacekeeping
context. Thus, in addition to the kinds of claims mentioned in the Secretary
General’s letter to the U.S. Congressmen, the U.N. has since its inception
recognized that those directly injured as a result of negligent activity by the
Organization, for example in the maintenance of the U.N. Headquarters in
New York, are entitled to make a claim against the Organization. In
principle, the same is true in other instances where the U.N. might arguably
have failed to safely maintain or operate its facilities and equipment or
vehicles, including in the peacekeeping context. Indeed, it is more difficult
to understand the argument that the U.N. is not legally responsible for the
cholera outbreak, at least in part, in light of the special legal regime
established by the U.N. in the late 1990s to deal with claims by private
individuals specifically in the context of peace- keeping operations.
Thus, it is difficult to understand what is meant by “broad issues of
policy that arose out of the functions of the U.N. as an international
organization” and which “could not form the basis of a claim of a private law
                                                
63. See Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Between the United Nations and
Belgium Relating to the Settlement of Claims Filed Against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian
Nationals, Belg.-United Nations, Feb. 20, 1965, 535 U.N.T.S. 198.
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character”64 or how such an argument is consistent with the long history of
the U.N. responding to claims for personal injury resulting from the actions
of the Organization and the specific provisions of the peacekeeping liability
regime.
Notably, were the U.N. to acknowledge some responsibility, it would
be open to the Organization to work out with the Government of Haiti and
other interested parties some appropriate way to address that responsibility.
Of course, any such outcome could and should take into account the ongoing
efforts of the U.N. more generally to prevent the further spread of cholera in
Haiti and provide the afflicted communities and individuals with assistance.
What is important for the reputation and credibility of U.N. is for it to
acknowledge some responsibility for the crisis and, as a good citizen on the
world stage, to address that responsibility. It appears that the U.N. may in
fact be moving in that direction.
Thus, the U.N. has recently dramatically changed its position regarding
the Haiti cholera victims both offering an apology for not having done more
to assist the victims of the cholera as the tragedy unfolded and
acknowledging that it has a “moral” obligation to assist the victims.65
In August of 2016, Secretary Ban Ki Moon, whose term would conclude
at the end of the year, announced a new approach to cholera in Haiti. He
stated that he deeply regrets the terrible suffering that the people of Haiti have
endured as a result of the epidemic and that the U.N. has a moral
responsibility to the victims and to support Haiti in overcoming the epidemic.
The Secretary General indicated that the new approach, that he aimed to
present to the General Assembly, consisted of two tracks. Track One, to
intensify support for cholera control and response, and Track Two, a proposal
to provide material assistance for those most affected by cholera.66
The announcement of this new approach is said to have been prompted
by the Report of Philip Alston, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty
and Human Rights.67 A draft of Alston’s report became known to the U.N.
                                                
64. Letter from Ban Ki-moon, supra note 46.
65. See Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Apologizes for United Nations
Role in Haiti Cholera Epidemic, Urges International Funding of New Response to Disease, U.N. Press
Release SG/SM/18323-GA/11862 (Dec. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Statement of Secretary General of Dec. 1,
2016]; see also New Approach, supra note 61.
66. New Approach, supra note 61, ¶ 1.
67. See Philip Alston, Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human
Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER (Oct. 5, 2016), https://assets.document
cloud.org/documents/3173480/United-Nations-Letters-on-Cholera.pdf; see also Phillip Alston (Special
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Human Right) Statement 2016/68 (Oct. 25, 2016) [hereinafter
Statement of Philip Alston].
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Secretariat and the public about the same time that the Secretary General
announced his new approach to cholera in Haiti. Notably, both of those
developments occurred around the same time as the U.S. Court of Appeals
announced its decision rejecting the appeal of the Haitian claimants on
immunity grounds.
In October, the U.N. Security Council, in renewing the mandate for the
Haiti peacekeeping mission, took note of intention of the Secretary General
to develop a package that would provide material assistance and support to
those Haitians directly affected by cholera.68
In November, the Secretary General issued his report to the General
Assembly elaborating his proposals for a two-track approach to cholera in
Haiti. The proposals in Track One involve intensifying the Organization’s
support in order to reduce and ultimately end transmission of cholera,
improve access to care and treatment and address longer-term issues of water,
sanitation and health systems in Haiti. Track Two proposes the development
of a package that will provide material assistance and support to those
Haitians most directly affected by cholera. The Secretary General stressed
that these efforts must include, as a central focus, the victims of the disease
and their families.
Track One essentially is a continuation and enhancement of the
initiative that the Secretary General and the U.N. had launched in 2014, but
which never received the financial support envisioned in those proposals and
was overtaken by the impact of Hurricane Matthew on Haiti.69 Track Two,
however, contains new elements intended to reflect the Organization’s
commitment to assist and support those most directly affected.70 The Report
states that consideration is given under Track Two to two possible elements:
a) a community approach; and b) an individual approach.71 Under the
community approach, victims and their families and affected communities
would receive assistance and support through community projects, in
particular relating to poverty, poor housing, and lack of basic services.72
Projects would be established in consultation with communities and, to the
extent possible, linked to and coordinated with Track One.73 The Report
indicates that the individual approach relates to the payment of money to
families of those individuals who died of cholera, suggesting the payment of
                                                
68. S.C. Res. 2313, ¶ 3 (Oct. 13, 2016).
69. New Approach, supra note 61, ¶ 20.
70. Id. ¶ 36.
71. Id. ¶ 41.
72. Id. ¶ 42.
73. Id. ¶¶ 41–42.
2017]                                               Rashkow 359
a fixed amount per deceased individual that would be the same for each
household.74
As the Report acknowledges, Track Two “is aimed at providing a
meaningful, but necessarily imperfect, response to the impact of cholera on
individuals, families and communities.”75 The Report candidly highlights
the many imperfections in the initiative. It stresses that secure funding
simply to enable “development of a meaningful package” is essential to
ensuring the appropriate consultations, including at the state and local level
in Haiti, and is useful to avoid raising expectations.76 It provides that it is
“imperative” to have the assurance of adequate funding for community
projects prior even to conducting consultations in the affected communities.77
With respect to the individual approach, it asserts that accurate information
as to the number of cholera deaths and the identification of the deceased and
their family members is required, while identifying serious challenges in
obtaining such information. As with the community based approach, the
Report states that the individual approach would also require “further
development of the package”, which would itself require funding, as well as
the certainty of a threshold amount of funding sufficient to provide a
meaningful fixed amount per cholera death.78 Finally, the Report stresses
that a priority is to be given to eliminating cholera and responding to the
devastating effects of Hurricane Matthew, and that the “new approach” to
cholera in Haiti is premised on the assumption that sufficient additional
“voluntary” funding will be made available to deliver on Track Two without
detracting from Track One.79
In December, the Secretary General presented his new approach to the
General Assembly and sought its support for this new initiative.80 In the
course of his comments, the Secretary General reiterated his deep regret for
the loss of life and suffering caused by the cholera outbreak in Haiti and,
again apologized on behalf of the U.N. to the Haitian people. The Secretary
General made clear that he was apologizing for the U.N. not having done
enough with regard to the cholera outbreak and its spread in Haiti. He again
referred to the U.N.’s failure in this regard as a “blemish” on the reputation
of U.N. peacekeeping and the Organization world-wide, and to the “moral
responsibility” on the U.N. to act. In this context, he acknowledged that
                                                
74. New Approach, supra note 61, ¶ 54.
75. Id. ¶ 36.
76. Id.
77. Id. ¶ 53.
78. Id. ¶¶ 55–59.
79. New Approach, supra note 61, ¶ 63.
80. See Statement of Secretary General of Dec. 1, 2016, supra note 65.
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funding for the efforts of the U.N. to assist the people of Haiti has proven
difficult to secure.
The Secretary General described the new two-track approach, for which
he requested $400 million over two years divided equally between Track One
and Track Two. He explained that work on Track One was well under way,
describing work being undertaken, thanking donors who have provided
support for Track One, and expressing the hope that further contributions
would become available soon. With respect to the community approach
under Track Two, he noted that the U.N. has been consulting with the
Government of Haiti and that the consultations will continue into 2017. His
comments reflected a focus on projects reflecting community needs not
related to cholera, such as education grants, microfinance and other
initiatives that would be complementary to and, to the extent possible,
consistent with work under Track One. With respect to the individual
approach, his comments focused on the requirements for identification of the
deceased and their family members and the certainty of sufficient funding for
compensation. In this respect, he expressed the need for further on the
ground consultations top develop this package, while acknowledging the
difficulties relating to the development of the needed information.
Concluding, the Secretary General referred to the “familiar obstacle” of
adequate funding; stressing that funding for Track One needs to be
prioritized.81
It is important to the standing and reputation of the U.N. and to the
people of Haiti that these new elements included an apology, even if the
apology was not in terms of the harm caused to the people of Haiti by the
negligence of the U.N. but rather in terms of the U.N. generally not doing
enough to help the people of Haiti deal with the cholera outbreak and its
spread. In this respect, the Secretary General was careful to cast the apology
in terms of the “moral responsibility” of the U.N., as distinguished from any
legal responsibility. Whether this apology and the enhanced efforts of the
U.N. to address the suffering of the Haitian people are sufficient to
effectively remove the “blemish” on the reputation of the U.N. remains to be
seen, especially in light of the challenges identified by the Secretary General
to the implementation of the new approach, both in terms of funding the new
approach and, in regard to the development of modalities and funding to
address the individual element of Track Two.
III. REMEDIES FOR HARM CAUSED BY U.N. PEACEKEEPERS IN REGARD TO
MISCONDUCT RELATING TO SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE (SEA)
Sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. staff and officials and U.N.
peacekeepers became a significant issue during the 1990s and early 2000s in
                                                
81. Id.
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connection with the increase in U.N. peacekeeping activities in the Balkans
and Africa, particularly with widespread reports of such abuses by U.N.
peacekeeping troops and civilian staff of the U.N.’s mission in the Congo—
MONUC—in 2004.82 While the U.N. has repeatedly taken actions over the
years to address this problem, those actions failed to eliminate the problem.
Indeed, in the Spring of 2014, a new scandal arose in relation to allegations
that international troops serving in a U.N. authorized peacekeeping mission
in the Central African Republic (CAR) had sexually abused a number of
young children in exchange for food or money, and that the U.N. failed to act
timely or appropriately under U.N. policies and mandates in response to those
allegations.83 The scandal has led to new and proposed actions by the U.N.
to strengthen its regime against SEA.
In 2003, in response to reports of sexual exploitation of refugees by aid
workers in West Africa in the early 2000s, Secretary General Annan issued
a Bulletin expressly prohibiting conduct that constitutes SEA by U.N. staff,
including the staff of the separately administered organs and programs of the
U.N.84 The Bulletin stipulates that any acts of sexual exploitation and abuse
committed by U.N. staff members or persons under contract with the U.N.
“constitute acts of serious misconduct and are therefore grounds for
disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal”. 85 In addition to
disciplinary action, in cases where SEA has been determined to have
occurred, the U.N. routinely considers referral of the matter to the national
authorities of the perpetrator for prosecution or other appropriate action.86
Notably, U.N. civilian police and military observers and U.N.
peacekeeping troops were not covered by this Bulletin. 87 In 2004, the
Secretary General formally extended the prohibitions in the Bulletin to
civilian police and military observers.88 However, U.N. peacekeeping troops
are traditionally subject to the exclusive authority of their contingent
                                                
82. See generally Rep. of an Indep. Review on Sexual Exploitation & Abuse by Int’l
Peacekeeping Forces in the Cent. Afr. Rep., transmitted by Letter Dated June 23, 2016, from the Secretary-
General to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/71/99 (June 23, 2016) [hereinafter Kompass Inquiry
Report].
83. Id.
84. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Special Measures for Protection
From Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, § 3, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 (Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter
Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Special Measures for Protection 2003].
85. Id. § 3.2(a).
86. Id. § 5.
87. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 24, 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the President of the General Assembly, ¶¶ 14–22, ¶¶ A.14–21 U.N. Doc. A/59/710 (Mar. 24, 2005).
[hereinafter Zeid Report].
88. See id. ¶ A.17–21.
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commander and national authorities. Under the circumstances, it is up to that
commander and the national authorities of that Member State to address
allegations of SEA against these individuals.89
In 2005, in response to subsequent and numerous reports of SEA in
peacekeeping missions, the Secretary General commissioned a report by a
panel led by Ambassador Zeid from Jordan on the subject of SEA.90 The
resulting Zeid report addressed a wide spectrum of behavior ranging from
solicitation of prostitutes, which was legal in some host countries, to acts
considered criminal offenses in virtually all countries, such as rape and
pedophilia.91 This included rape disguised as prostitution, for instance when
the victim was given money or food to give the acts the appearance of
consent.92 In addition, the report addressed the issue of “peacekeeper babies”
which is very difficult to address because of the absence often of an effective
legal system in the host country.93
As the response to the Zeid report demonstrated, the issue of addressing
SEA in the U.N. peacekeeping context is complicated by the fundamental
nature of U.N. peacekeeping, where members of troop contributing
contingents are under the exclusive authority of the commanders of those
contingents, not the U.N. In a nutshell, the regime for military contingents
is that complaints are referred to national contingents who are responsible for
investigating and taking appropriate action. This has usually involved
repatriating the named individuals and following up in the troop contributing
member state. There is a responsibility to report the results of the
investigation and follow up action to the U.N.94 The Zeid panel came up with
a number of recommendations.95 Unfortunately, the U.N. General Assembly
declined to act on a number of those recommendations, primarily those that
would undermine the exclusive authority of the national troop contingent
commanders.
                                                
89. See Bruce Rashkow, AJIL Unbound, Remedies for Harm Caused by UN Peacekeepers, AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. (Apr. 2, 2014 3:55 PM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/remedies-harm-caused-unpeace
keepers; see also Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Manual (setting out terms and conditions for
deploying troop continents voluntarily provided to UN), A/C.5/60/26 (2005), as revised by report of the
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group on 2007 resumed session,
A/61/19 (Part III) (2007), Annex, Article 7 quinquiens, ¶ 1; U.N. Secretary General, Model Status of
Forces Agreement, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990).
90. Zeid Report, supra note 87.
91. Id. ¶ 3.
92. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
93. Id. ¶ 6.
94. See Rashkow, AJIL Unbound, Remedies for Harm Caused by UN Peacekeepers, supra note
89, ¶ 15; see also A/61/19 (Part III), supra note 89 Annex, Article 7 sexiens, ¶ 1.
95. Zeid Report, supra note 87, ¶¶ 23–27, 31–36, 38–65, 68–93.
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Nonetheless, following the 2005 Zeid report, the U.N. implemented a
number of important initiatives to address SEA in order to educate and
sensitize both U.N. peacekeeping personnel and the local population as to
what SEA is and the responsibility of U.N. for responding to allegations of
such misconduct, including the procedures for dealing with complaints, and
measures for assisting the victims of SEA. Among these initiatives are the
following:
a) In 2007, the Model Memorandum of Understanding to be used
between troop contributing states and the U.N. was revised to include
and make applicable to U.N. peacekeeping contingents the specific
prohibitions against SEA from the 2003 Bulletin.96
b) In 2008, the U.N. adopted its Comprehensive Strategy on
Assistance to Victims of SEA by U.N. staff and related personnel.97 The
Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance, specifically provides for basic
assistance and support to both complainants and victims of SEA.98
Assistance and support takes the form of medical care, legal services,
support to deal with psychological and social effects of the experience
as well as material care, such as food, clothing, emergency and safe
shelter.99 Children born as a result of SEA are to receive assistance with
their individual needs, and the U.N. is to work with member states to
facilitate within their competence, the pursuit of claims related to
paternity and child support.100 However, the Comprehensive Strategy
expressly provides at the outset that “the strategy shall in no way
diminish or replace the individual responsibility for acts of sexual
exploitation and abuse, which rests with the perpetrators” adding that
“the strategy is not intended as a means for compensation”.101 As this
provision suggests, SEA is considered in the same manner as ordinary
criminal acts by U.N. personnel, not U.N. actions for or which the U.N.
might be liable to third parties.
c) Also in 2008, the U.N. passed a resolution providing for the
criminal accountability of U.N. officials and experts on mission.102 That
resolution, inter alia, urged member States to consider establishing
                                                
96. A/61/19 (Part III), supra note 89, ¶¶ 28–29.
97. G.A. Res. 62/214, United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to
Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel, ¶ 1 (Distr. Mar.
7, 2008).
98. Id. ¶ A.4.
99. Id. ¶ A.6–7.
100. Id. ¶ A.8.
101. Id. ¶ A.3.
102. G.A. Res. 62/63, Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on
Mission (Distr. Jan. 8, 2008).
364 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law       [Vol. 23:2
jurisdiction over crimes in their domestic laws committed by their
nationals while serving as U.N. officials or experts, at least where the
conduct as defined in the law of the State establishing jurisdiction also
constitutes a crime under the laws of the host state.103
d) In 2012, the Secretary General initiated a policy of human rights
screening of U.N. peacekeeping personnel to prevent selection and
deployment of individuals involved in human rights violations,
including SEA. 104 Under this policy, the Secretary General has
reaffirmed the authority to request the repatriation of any individual
contingent member alleged to having engaged in SEA or other human
rights violations.105 Indeed, the Secretary General has asserted the
authority to request the repatriation of entire units if the circumstances
so warranted. He has exercised that authority in connection with both
individual continent members and entire units.106
In addition, since the Zeid report, the Secretary General has issued
regular reports regarding the implementation of U.N. initiatives to address
SEA, including an annual report on “Special Measures for the Protection
from Exploitation and Sexual Abuse”. 107 Unfortunately, those reports
demonstrate that while the situation has improved, there continue to be
problems with compliance by troop contributing states, both in terms of
complaints of violations of the SEA prohibitions by contingent members and
with the timely follow up by troop contributing states on such complaints.108
In 2016, the independent Kompass Inquiry Panel issued its report.109
That report was highly critical of the U.N. and its handling of SEA in the
Central African Republic (CAR). Extraordinary for any U.N. inquiry, the
Kompass Report identified three very high officials that it said had abused
their authority and another seven high officials that were the subject of
“adverse observations” for failure to act appropriately in the face of the
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serious allegations of SEA. 110 The Kompass Report made twelve
recommendations for going forward to better deal with SEA in the
peacekeeping context.111
In February 2016, the Secretary General issued a report laying out his
plans for evaluating and addressing the recommendations of the Kompass
Report, including a number of measures already taken to address those
recommendations. The report also contained requests from the Secretary
General to the General Assembly to assist in addressing the
recommendations, including recommendations that related to the exclusive
authority of the Member States contributing U.N. peacekeeping troops over
such troops.112
In March 2016, the Security Council adopted a resolution addressing
the Kompass Report and the Secretary General’s initial response to the
report. 113 The Security Council endorsed the strong response by the
Secretary General to the continuing allegations of SEA in peacekeeping and
welcomed the appointment by the Secretary General of a Special Coordinator
to assist the Secretary General in improving the U.N.’s response to SEA,
while also affirming a number of the Secretary General’s ongoing
initiatives.114
In June 2016, the Secretary General issued his annual report on
“Combatting Sexual Exploitation andAbuse”where he updated his February
report on the ongoing efforts to evaluate and address the Kompass Inquiry
Report recommendations, and otherwise strengthen the Organizations
response to SEA.115 The Secretary General reported on the status of the
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recommendations.
Only four of the twelve were accepted without qualification:
recommendations four (mandatory and immediate reporting of all
allegations); six (review U.N. policies dealing with confidentiality); seven
(establishment of a trust fund for victims of SEA); ten (adoption of an
approach to immunity that presumes cooperation of U.N. staff in
accountability process).116
Five recommendations are partially accepted: one (acknowledge that
SEA by peacekeepers is a form of conflict related sexual violence to be
addressed under U.N. human rights policy); two (creation of a coordination
unit within Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
reporting directly to the Commissioner of OHCHR); three (creation of a
working group to support the Coordination Unit made up of experts to
develop a single policy harmonizing the SEA human rights policies and
develop processes promoting criminal accountability); eleven (the U.N.
negotiate with troop contributing states provisions for screening troops ); and
twelve (maintain a comprehensive and up to date human rights data base
hosted by OHCHR).117
The remaining three were “under consideration”: five (establishment of
a professional investigative team under the authority of the Coordination Unit
to be made available for immediate deployment when SEA is reported); eight
(the U.N. negotiate with troop contributing countries provisions to ensure
prosecution, including by granting host countries subsidiary jurisdiction to
prosecute); and nine (the U.N. negotiate the inclusion in agreements with
troop contributing countries provisions ensuring transparency and
cooperation in accountability processes).118
Notably, the three “under consideration” and most of the five only
“partially accepted” relate to the traditional exclusive authority of the
commander of the national contingent and national authorities of troop
contributing countries. These recommendations in many respects harken
back to the recommendations of the Zeid report on which the General
Assembly was unable to reach agreement because of the objections of troop
contributing countries.
Subsequently, the Secretary General issued his annual 2017 Report in
February dealing with Special Measures for the protection from sexual
abuse.119 The 2017 report presents the Secretary General’s “new approach”
to preventing and responding to SEA. Following on the Kompass Report and
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earlier responses by the Secretary General and the Organization to the
findings, conclusions and recommendations of that Report, the 2017
Secretary General’s report outlines a victim-centered strategy rooted in
transparency, accountability and ensuring justice. The “new approach” seeks
to build on a strong partnership with Member States.
The Secretary General’s 2017 report describes a four-part strategy.
First, elevating the voice of the victims themselves and putting their rights
and dignity at the forefront of the efforts to combat SEA. This would include
tangibly improving the medical, social, legal and financial assistance
provided to the victims “where appropriate”. Second, ending impunity for
those guilty of SEA. This would include greater transparency on reporting
and investigations. Third, building a truly multi stake network to support the
efforts of the U.N., which includes more direct and continuous engagement
with civil society and other experts and organizations. Fourth, raise
awareness worldwide regarding the problem of SEA to address the stigma
and discrimination that victims face and promote the U.N. as a global
platform for sharing best practices in prevention and response.120
Among the many proposals contained in the report, they include the
following relating to “Reconnecting to United Nations values and
principles”: strengthen the initial screening of candidates for every U.N.
post; ensure that individuals terminated owing to substantiated allegations of
SEA will not be rehired in any other part of the Organization; request that a
clause be included into the personal history profile or its equivalent as to
whether the applicant was the subject of pending allegations or disciplinary
measures at the time of separation, and agreeing to sharing this information
with other U.N. entities; cooperate, “as appropriate”, with Governments and
external organizations in the conduct of their own reference checks; and ask
Member States to enter voluntarily into a “Compact” on specific measures to
strengthen efforts to address SEA.121
In regard to “[p]utting the rights and dignity of victims first”, the report
proposes, inter alia to:
a) Conduct and issue the results of risk assessments of each
operational deployment in terms of SEA.122
b) Appoint a system wide victim’s right advocate reporting directly
to the Secretary General, to work within the Organization and with local
authorities and civil society organizations to ensure victims access to
appropriate and timely judicial processes; to ensure that every victim
receives appropriate personal care, follow up attention and information
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on the progress of his or her case; to build networks of support and to
assist in ensuring that the full effect of local laws are brought to bear.123
c) Instruct the appointment in the four peacekeeping operations with
the highest number of cases of SEA to identify a position to perform the
functions of victims’ right advocate, and request Member States to
regularize that position.124
d) Regularize and apply globally the 2016 Draft Victims’ Assistance
protocol following the ongoing pilot period testing.125
e) Request Member States to increase the resources to support
victims considering the following possible mechanisms: permit direct
assistance out of existing Trust Fund to Support Victims of SEA;
withhold reimbursement payments to troop contributing countries in the
event that investigations are not undertaken, reported on and concluded
in a timely manner and transfer the amounts withheld to the Trust
Fund.126
f) Request Member States receive claims from victims, and call upon
them to establish mechanisms to do so.127
g) Explore the possible use of ex gratis payments to victims in
exceptional cases and where the Member State mechanisms do not lead
to an appropriate outcome.128
h) Propose that mandating bodies (Security Council and General
Assembly) endorse, as appropriate, a special protocol on preventing
SEA as part of the mandates and budgets they approve that could
include, for example, strict guidelines on fraternization, prohibitions on
alcohol consumption.129
i) Seek Member State support for system wide consolidated
confidential repository of case information to be placed under the
supervision of the Special Coordinator on Improving the U.N. Response
to SEA.130
Some of the most important and controversial proposals in the report
relate to ending impunity:
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a) Improve speed, accuracy and comprehensiveness in report of
serious allegations of SEA, including the development of a standardized
incident reporting form.131
b) Support the strengthening of community based complaint
mechanisms.132
c) Present proposals to Member States for consolidating the many
investigative capacities throughout the Organization dealing with SEA,
creating specialist cadre of SEA investigators.133
d) Seek to establish clear procedures to address unacceptable
behaviors by implementing partners and commercial vendors who
operate in the name of the U.N.134
e) Strive to neither solicit nor accept contributions to the work of the
U.N. by any person, company or Government that does not demonstrate
an active commitment to the values of the U.N. in regard to SEA.135
f) Engage with Heads of State or Government of States that fail to
follow up after the U.N. refers SEA cases for their action.136
g) Renew call upon Member States to extend extraterritorial
jurisdiction over crimes that may be committed by their nationals when
assigned to the U.N. or operating under its authority.137
In the Report, the Secretary General elaborated on the commitments he
proposed Member States make under the voluntary Compact that he proposes
between him and those states. 138 Some of these commitments reflect
proposals already identified above, such as the commitment to cooperate
fully with the victims’ rights advocate; agree to implementation of
procedures to withhold reimbursement to U.N. troops in the event
investigations are not undertaken, reported or concluded in a timely manner,
and to transfer withheld payments to the Trust Fund in substantiated cases.139
Others are complimentary to these earlier proposals, such as appoint focal
points in capitals to serve as a direct liaison for victims to address potential
paternity claims and assist the U.N. in following up on such cases, and agree
to exercise or establish extraterritorial jurisdiction of crimes committed by
civilian personnel when assigned to the U.N. or operating under its
authority.140
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Other proposals, for example some of those relating to the conduct of
investigations bear on what has historically been viewed as the exclusive
authority of troop contributing states over their contingent members. 141
Some of these proposals are familiar, harkening back to the 1995 Zeid report
and the more recent Kompass Report. Thus, the Secretary General proposes
that in the proposed Compact, Member States commit to joint investigations
with the U.N. or with independent, external experts; or agree to “in situ” court
martials or permit live streaming to enable victims’ access to criminal
proceedings.142 There is also a proposal that Member States agree to obtain
DNA on a voluntary basis from all deployed personnel for purposes
exoneration or conviction where such evidence would be indispensable.143
The Secretary General specifically seeks to extend protection against
SEA to the conduct of non U.N. international forces authorized by the U.N.
by asking the Security Council to ensure that when it authorizes such
deployments it call on such states to take a variety of steps similar to those in
place for U.N. personnel, and to work with the regional organizations which
provide forces under the authorization of the U.N. otherwise to reduce the
potential for SEA. 144
IV. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, both in regard to the Haiti
cholera claims and in regard to SEA, there have been significant
developments within the U.N. Those developments with respect to the Haiti
cholera claims suggest that the problems relating to the introduction of
cholera into Haiti arose more from failures to timely and conscientiously
follow the provisions of the existing regime that governs those matters. The
question in such circumstances is whether the U.N. can muster the political
will to do the right thing in a timely manner. It appears that as the end of his
term approached, the immediate past Secretary General paused to consider
whether the U.N. under his leadership had failed in the past and that he was
determined as he departed office to set a new course going forward.
Whatever happens going forward after his departure, the immediate past
Secretary General by his actions has helped to restore some of the U.N.’s
credibility that had been lost because of this matter over the past few years.
That said the question remains as to how the U.N. under the new Secretary
General will follow up on this initiative.
The situation regarding SEA is in a sense simpler and more complex.
As the Kompass Report amply demonstrates, the problems that have arisen
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were primarily driven clearly by failures to timely and conscientiously follow
existing mandates on U.N. offices and officials and the specific regime that
governs SEA. While that Report concludes that “fragmented bureaucracy”
contributed to the failure of the U.N. to prevent the sexual abuse of children
in the CAR, it also identified a “culture of impunity” and an “abdication of
responsibility”. Thus, it is clear from the report that the primary cause was
the failure of individuals with clear responsibilities and clear opportunities to
act, failed to do so. It is extraordinary that three of the highest-ranking
officials in the U.N. were found to have “abused their authority” and that
seven other high officials were the subjects of “adverse observations” in this
regard. A close reading of those findings must lead one to conclude that the
failure in this instance was one of individuals to act conscientiously and
timely under existing mandates and policies.
That said, the SEA situation is more complex in that it must address the
tensions between a vigorous and timely response to allegations of SEA and
the reluctance of troop contributing countries to surrender the exclusive
authority they have over their forces in a peacekeeping mission. This tension
addresses the regimes that govern SEA, and particularly the response by
troop contributing countries to allegations of SEA by their troops. This
tension became obvious with the Zeid report and is reflected again in the
response of the Secretary General to the twelve Kompass Report
recommendations, especially the three that were originally “under
consideration” as well as some of the five that were originally “partially
accepted.”
The new Secretary General, in his February 2017 SEA report, seeks to
resolve that tension, as did the Zeid and Kompass reports, in favor of greater
protections and more effective and timely responses to SEA.145 Specifically,
his proposals more fully reflect acceptance of the five recommendations that
were previously only “partially accepted” as well as the three that were only
“under consideration.”146 All eight of those recommendations, as previously
noted, relate to the traditional exclusive authority of troop contributing states
over their forces. There is no doubt that progress has already been made, and
more will be made. However, it remains to be seen whether and to what
extent the proposals relating to those eight recommendations in the Kompass
Report will be accepted by the General Assembly, including most
importantly by the troop contributing states who have resisted in the past
serious inroads to their traditional exclusive authority.
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